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ABSTRACT: In (Schupbach 2008), I put forward a “possibility result” for Bayesian Coherentism, showing that there ex-
ist plausible sets of ceteris paribus conditions that imply that coherence is truth-conducive. Against this result, 
Schubert (2012) argues that the specific ceteris paribus conditions I consider are “jointly inconsistent”. In this 
article, I prove to the contrary that these conditions can consistently be enforced while allowing degrees of co-
herence to vary. Next, I consider a related criticism, inspired by Olsson’s (2005) constraints on ceteris paribus 
conditions. This leads to a general discussion of the principle(s) that should guide one in choosing appropri-
ately stringent ceteris paribus conditions.
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RESUMEN: En (Schupbach 2008) planteo un “resultado de posibilidad” para el bayesianismo coherentista mostrando 
que existen conjuntos plausibles de condiciones ceteris paribus que implican que la coherencia conduce a la ver-
dad. Schubert (2012) argumenta en contra de este resultado que las condiciones ceteris paribus que considero 
son “inconsistentes tomadas conjuntamente”. En este artículo demuestro, sin embargo, que estas condiciones 
pueden ser satisfechas permitiendo que los grados de coherencia varíen. Abordo después una crítica relacionada 
con la anterior e inspirada en los requisitos impuestos por Olsson (2005) a las condiciones ceteris paribus. Eso 
lleva a una discusión general del principio, o principios, que debería guiarnos para elegir unas condiciones ceteris 
paribus que sean apropiadas, es decir, que no sean ni muy restrictivas, ni demasiado laxas. 
Palabras clave: bayesianismo, condiciones ceteris paribus, coherencia, confirmación, resultado de imposibilidad, probabi-
lidad.
1. Introduction
Bovens and Hartmann’s (2003; 2006) “impossibility result’’ for Bayesian Coherentism as-
serts that “there cannot exist a measure of coherence that is probabilistic and induces a co-
herence ordering [...] and that simultaneously makes it the case that the more coherent the 
information set, the more confident we are that the information is true, ceteris paribus’’ 
(2003, 21). In a previous article (Schupbach 2008), I point out that this result is sensitive 
to choice of ceteris paribus conditions; Bovens and Hartmann specify a particular set of ce-
teris paribus conditions, and this move is crucial to the proof of their impossibility result. 
Moreover, I note that choice of coherence measure intersects with choice of ceteris paribus 
conditions; the ceteris paribus conditions that seem appropriate to endorse will vary de-
pending on how one explicates the notion of coherence. 
In order to clarify exactly why this is a problem for Bovens and Hartmann, I offer a 
“possibility result’’ for Bayesian Coherentism. I assume, for the sake of the argument, that 
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one accepts Shogenji’s (1999) measure of coherence. For any n-membered information set 
{A1, A2, ..., An}, this measure is defined as follows: 
C({A1 ,A2 ,...,An })=def
Pr(A1∧A2∧...∧An)
Pr(A1)×Pr(A2)× ...×Pr(An)
The specific ceteris paribus conditions for coherence that Bovens and Hartmann adopt 
make little sense given the Shogenji measure. Accordingly, I suggest the following alterna-
tive set of conditions (where Ei represents the proposition that witness i asserts that Ai is 
true):1 
(1) Total individual strength Pr(A1) × Pr(A2) × ... × Pr(An) should be held fixed.
(2) Expectedness of the reports Pr(E1 ∧ E2 ∧ ... ∧ En) should be held fixed.
(3) Reliability of the information sources should be held fixed.
Condition (3) is formally vague; however, minimally, I propose that (3) should at least en-
tail that the true positive rate Pr(Ei | Ai) be held fixed for all i.2 
Given the Shogenji measure and this alternative set of ceteris paribus conditions, it is easy 
to show that coherence is truth-conducive in the relevant sense: the more coherent the infor-
mation set, the more confident we ought to be that the information is true, ceteris paribus. 
But it is also true that Shogenji’s account provides a measure of coherence that is probabilistic 
and induces a coherence ordering. The upshot is that there exist compelling probabilistic ac-
counts of coherence and corresponding sets of ceteris paribus conditions that do not fall prey 
to Bovens and Hartmann’s impossibility result; Bayesian Coherentism is possible after all. 
This paper considers two objections to this defense of Bayesian Coherentism’s possibil-
ity, both of which criticize ceteris paribus conditions (1)–(3) as overly stringent. After ar-
guing against both objections, I offer some general remarks about the stringency of ceteris 
paribus conditions and the principles that correctly guide one in choosing such conditions. 
2. Do (1)–(3) Fix Coherence?
Schubert (2012, 7) argues that I have “not managed to defeat the impossibility result.’’ His 
critique rests on the claim that conditions (1)–(3) entail a constant degree of coherence (as 
1 Note that measure C makes no reference at all to any Ei; that is, the Shogenji measure applies to in-
formation sets apart from any witness context. Nonetheless, Bovens and Hartmann frame their entire 
study of coherence within such a context, including their impossibility result. Consequently, one must 
introduce ceteris paribus conditions pertaining to such a witness context in order to investigate their 
bearing on Bovens and Hartmann’s impossibility result. For more on coherence and witness scenarios, 
see (Olsson 2005, ch. 2).
2 Actually, the requirement is weaker than this. For the possibility result to go through, it merely needs 
to be the case that there exists some plausible explication of reliability, which entails that if we hold relia-
bility fixed, then the true positive rate be held fixed (but not necessarily that if we hold the true positive 
rate fixed, we are thereby holding reliability fixed). In (2008, 329), I motivate this formal requirement 
by showing that Bovens and Hartmann seem to require this as part of their own reliability condition.
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measured by C). That is, one cannot vary degree of coherence while enforcing these cete-
ris paribus conditions. If this is true, it does indeed spell trouble for the possibility result. It 
amounts to showing that the ceteris paribus conditions driving that result are not plausibly 
describing “all else’’ other than coherence but instead encompass coherence as well. In this 
case, one cannot possibly have differing degrees of coherence ceteris paribus, and so one 
cannot possibly show that coherence is truth-conducive in the relevant sense. 
Stated formally, Schubert’s central claim is as follows (where we are comparing two 
probability distributions Pr and Pr' and where n = 2):
Schubert’s Claim. If all of the following conditions hold:
(1) Pr(A1) × Pr(A2) = Pr' (A1) × Pr' (A2)
(2) Pr(E1 ∧ E2) = Pr' (E1 ∧ E2)
(3) Pr(E1 | A1) = Pr' (E1 | A1), Pr(E2 | A2) = Pr' (E2 | A2), Pr(E1 | ¬A1) = Pr' (E1 | ¬A1), 
and Pr(E2 | ¬A2) = Pr' (E2 | ¬A2), 3
then it necessarily follows that: 
CPr {A1,A2}( )= Pr(A1∧A2 )Pr(A1)×Pr(A2 )
= P ′r (A1∧A2 )
P ′r (A1)×P ′r (A2 )
=CP ′r {A1,A2}( ) .
 
Because the terms in the denominators of CPr({A1, A2}) and CPr' ({A1, A2}) must 
be equal by condition (1), this amounts to the claim that (1)-(3) imply that 
Pr(A1 ∧ A2) = Pr' (A1 ∧ A2).
In order to prove this claim, Schubert investigates a particular probability distribution ac-
cording to which Pr(A1) = Pr(A2) = .5, Pr(A1 ∧ A2) = .25, Pr(E1 | A1) = Pr(E2 | A2) = .75, and 
Pr(E1 | ¬A1) = Pr(E2 | ¬A2) = .25. From these probabilities, one can calculate CPr({A1, A2}) = 1 
and Pr(E1 ∧ E2) = .25. Schubert’s strategy then is to instantiate the contrapositive of his 
claim by showing that another distribution Pr' that results in a differing amount of coher-
ence (so that Pr(A1 ∧ A2) ≠ Pr' (A1 ∧ A2)) will have to break with at least one of conditions 
(1)-(3). To this end, Schubert stipulates that Pr' (A1 ∧ A2) = .375 ≠ Pr(A1 ∧ A2). Through a 
clever bit of algebra, Schubert shows that this stipulated fact and condition (3) together im-
ply the following system of equations: 
3 Note the discrepancy between my condition (3) and Schubert's strengthening of this condition. In-
terestingly, while the possibility result only requires the weaker version of (3), Schubert's proposed 
proof (as summarized below) relies crucially upon the stronger condition – which additionally re-
quires that Pr(Ei | ¬Ai) be held fixed, for all i. To see this, notice that specific values for Pr' (A1 ∧ ¬A2), 
Pr' (¬A1 ∧ A2), and Pr' (¬A1 ∧ ¬A2) are no longer determined by equations (E1) and (E2) when the 
values of Pr' (E1 | ¬A1) and Pr' (E2 | ¬A2) are unknown. But then values for Pr' (A1) and Pr' (A2) are 
likewise undetermined, and thus the argument no longer shows that ceteris paribus condition (1) is 
broken. One could therefore argue that Schubert's argument misses its mark, since it really criticizes a 
stronger set of conditions than those required for the possibility result. Here, however, we will take a 
different tack in criticizing Schubert's argument.
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(E1)
 
P ′r (A1∧¬A2 )P ′r (E1 |A1)P ′r (E2 |¬A2 )
+P ′r (¬A1∧A2 )P ′r (E1 |¬A1)P ′r (E2 |A2 )
+P ′r (¬A1∧¬A2 )P ′r (E1 |¬A1)P ′r (E2 |¬A2 )=5 /128  
(E2) P ′r (A1∧¬A2 )+P ′r (¬A1∧A2 )+P ′r (¬A1∧¬A2 )=5 /8  
By enforcing conditions (2) and (3), Schubert is able to solve these equations, proving in this case 
that Pr' (A1 ∧ ¬A2) = Pr' (¬A1 ∧ A2) = 0 and Pr' (¬A1 ∧ ¬A2) = 5/8. Given these values, we have 
Pr' (A1)=Pr' (A1 ∧ A2)+Pr' (A1 ∧ ¬A2)= .375 and Pr' (A2) = Pr' (A1 ∧ A2)+Pr' (¬A1 ∧ A2)= .375. 
From this it follows that Pr(A1) × Pr(A2) = 1/4 ≠ 9/64 = Pr' (A1) × Pr' (A2), and so condition 
(1) is not satisfied. In Schubert’s words (p. 9): “[T]his contradicts Schupbach’s clause (1) [...] At 
least one of Schupbach’s ceteris paribus-clauses must be given up. Hence his argument against 
Bovens and Hartmann’s impossibility proof, which relies on all three clauses, does not hold.’’ 
In order to evaluate Schubert’s criticism, first recall his central claim that conditions 
(1)–(3) entail fixed degrees of coherence, as measured by C. Schubert’s putative proof of 
this general point explores in detail a single case, a particular pair of probability distribu-
tions in which degrees of coherence are well-defined and differ in a particular way. But this 
is an odd strategy to take when the goal is to prove a general claim about all pairs of prob-
ability distributions that satisfy (1)–(3). Effectively, Schubert’s “proof’’ attempts to deduce 
a universal conclusion on the basis of one particular instance; he attempts to argue that All 
pairs of probability distributions that entail CPr({A1, A2}) ≠ CPr' ({A1, A2}) necessarily must 
break with one of the ceteris paribus conditions (1), (2), or (3) by proving that There exist 
pairs of probability distributions (at least one) that entail that CPr({A1, A2}) ≠ CPr' ({A1, A2}) 
but that break with one of these conditions. 
In proving this latter point, Schubert is effectively showing that not all cases in which 
coherence varies will be cases in which (1)–(3) can be enforced; in other words, allowable 
differences in coherence between probability distributions are constrained by the enforce-
ment of ceteris paribus conditions. However, it is the very nature of ceteris paribus condi-
tions to constrain one’s choice of available comparisons. Thus, it should come as no sur-
prise that there exist specific cases rendered incomparable by (1)–(3). We cannot just pick 
whatever probability distributions we like and expect that they will be comparable ceteris 
paribus. It seems to me that this is the legitimate conclusion of Schubert’s argument. 
Still, one might fairly wonder whether Schubert is right that conditions (1)–(3) force 
coherence to be held constant. That is, perhaps Schubert’s conclusion is correct even if his 
proof is misguided. The question is whether coherence can possibly fluctuate even while 
one enforces conditions (1), (2), and (3). It is not difficult to find distributions that show 
that it can. In fact, one can take Schubert’s own example but recommend a different fluc-
tuation in coherence (i.e., different than Schubert’s proposed fluctuation) without running 
into any conflict with the ceteris paribus conditions. 
Instead of increasing Pr(A1 ∧ A2) = .25 to Pr' (A1 ∧ A2) = .375 (a move which Schubert 
shows is not allowed by the ceteris paribus conditions), we can decrease the same term (e.g., 
to Pr' (A1 ∧ A2) = .17) without breaking with any of conditions (1)–(3) — see Proof 1 in 
appendix A. Moreover, whereas in this example we are comparing cases in which A1 and A2 
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are statistically independent and negatively relevant respectively, there are also such cases 
in which the propositions in question are positively relevant — see Proof 2 in appendix A. 
Indeed, contra Schubert, there are any number of such examples that can be put forward 
wherein degree of coherence can vary under conditions (1)–(3). 
3. Complete Separability as a Guide to Holding All Else Equal
At the heart of Schubert’s criticism is the idea that (1)–(3) are too stringent. We have 
shown above that, contra Schubert, these conditions do not imply fixed degrees of coher-
ence. However, one might still argue that these conditions are too strong. Doing so re-
quires spelling out plausible necessary constraints on what it is appropriate to include in a 
set of ceteris paribus conditions. If (1), (2), or (3) break any such constraints, than these are 
still too strong in the sense that the culpable condition(s) is barring certain comparisons 
that ought to be considered. 
Olsson (2002; 2005) proposes such a constraint. According to him, in order to “isolate 
a target property’’ (e.g., coherence) by enforcing ceteris paribus conditions, we must only 
be allowed to fix properties that are “completely separable’’ from the target property in the 
sense that changes to the former properties do not at all affect the latter property.4 So, for 
example, he objects even to holding the size of an information set constant in C’s ceteris 
paribus conditions given that C “is sensitive to’’ this number (2005, 123). 
If one accepts this as the appropriate criterion for choosing ceteris paribus condi-
tions, then conditions (1)–(3) are indeed too stringent and consequently the possibility 
result is ill-founded. For one thing, the size of an information set is assumed equal across 
sets in my proof of the possibility result. In addition, as Olsson notes, condition (1) in 
particular would require us to fix values of an information set’s total individual strength 
Pr(A1) × Pr(A2) × ... × Pr(An). However, this same term is the denominator of C. Conse-
quently, changing an information set’s total individual strength would manifestly affect its 
degree of coherence; fixing strength via our ceteris paribus conditions would “impose limi-
tations on the extent to which the degree of coherence can consistently vary’’ (2005, 122). 
Of course, this point will only cast the possibility result into doubt to the extent that 
Olsson’s criterion proves plausible. In defense of this criterion, Olsson asserts that vio-
lations of it would intuitively imply lack of full independent variability between factors 
(2005, 118); but there is no prior argument for the idea that ceteris paribus conditions 
must only fix factors that are fully independently variable with respect to the target prop-
erty. In general, Olsson’s discussion of, and case for, this criterion is driven by the idea that, 
4 Olsson first requires that appropriately fixed properties “vary independently’’ of the target property, 
where this requirement is violated in case “fixing the value of the one property imposes limitations 
on the extent to which the other property can consistently vary’’ (2005, 118). However, he effectively 
weakens this requirement to that stated above in his discussion and examples. For example, he argues 
that the size of information sets should not be held constant by coherence’s ceteris paribus conditions 
given that changes to an information set’s size (adding or subtracting members) “typically affects the 
degree of coherence,’’ in spite of the fact that changes in size per se do not limit degree of coherence’s 
range. When dealing with properties that are mathematically explicated, Olsson suggests that complete 
separability is lost when the target property can be represented as a function of another property.
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when aiming to prove a positive thesis about the isolated influence of coherence, one ought 
to fix as little as possible. Heeding this advice safeguards one’s study from concluding that 
something is generally true when really it is only true of an artificially restricted set of cases. 
But there is another danger from which such a study needs safeguarding, the very danger 
that motivates the enforcement of ceteris paribus conditions in the first place: that one 
might fail to isolate the target property and so allow other factors to confound our study. 
To avoid this danger, one must be sure to fix enough factors. 
The problem with Olsson’s criterion is that it focuses solely on avoiding the first dan-
ger, leaving his account susceptible to the second. That is, this principle apparently does 
not allow one to fix enough. One can point to cases where, in order to isolate some property, 
we would clearly want to fix some particular factor — else our study would be confounded 
— despite the fact that this factor is not completely separable from the target property. To 
take one example, say we are interested in investigating whether dietary habits have an in-
fluence on lung cancer rates. It is understood that whether or not someone is a smoker in-
fluences their dietary habits. Thus, if we should not hold factors constant that affect the 
factor of interest, then in this case, we would not want to control for smoking when try-
ing to isolate the influence of diet on lung cancer rates. But this would clearly be to allow 
smoking to confound our study. In this case, even though smoking and dietary habits are 
not “completely separable’’ from one another, it is still apparent that we should control for 
smoking when testing the influence of diet on lung cancer. In the same way, it may well be 
that the coherence of an information set is sensitive to that set’s total individual strength 
Pr(A1) × Pr(A2) × ... × Pr(An), but that we should still control for the latter in order to iso-
late the influence of the former. 
4. Regarding the Stringency of Ceteris Paribus Conditions
We have now discussed two objections to conditions (1)–(3). And I have argued against 
both, but for different reasons. On the one hand, Schubert’s argument assumes a necessary 
constraint on ceteris paribus conditions, one that is so obviously correct that it hardly re-
quires mentioning: in order to hold all else equal, one should only fix factors other than the 
target property. Let us call this principle partial separability, the idea being that a property 
must at least be partially separable from the target property in order to be appropriately 
fixed by the latter’s ceteris paribus conditions. Schubert argues that (1)–(3) collectively 
break this condition, that these jointly imply that we’re fixing coherence itself. But while 
partial separability is surely a sound constraint on one’s choice of ceteris paribus condi-
tions, I have shown that Schubert is mistaken; (1)–(3) fix properties that are partially sepa-
rable from coherence. 
On the other hand, there is nothing wrong with the argument showing that these 
same properties are not completely separable from coherence. The second objection as-
serts that since this is the case, these properties have no place in coherence’s ceteris pari-
bus conditions. But the problem here is with the principle of complete separability that 
it relies on; viz., that in order to hold all else equal, one should only fix factors completely 
separable from the target property. I have argued that this principle does not allow us to 
fix all of the appropriate properties; it prohibits us from controlling for confounding fac-
tors. 
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Should we require partial separability alone of our ceteris paribus conditions? In this 
case, we would require that any factor be held constant (in addition to those already fixed), 
so long as doing so does not also fix the target property.5 This proposal runs into at least 
two important problems. First, the criterion would underdetermine the sets of factors that 
ought to be fixed as part of a target property’s ceteris paribus conditions. Consider again 
coherence explicated using C. Recall that C’s denominator explicates a notion of “total in-
dividual strength’’ that is conceptually distinct from coherence. But C’s numerator also 
explicates a conceptually distinct notion, namely, the joint plausibility of the relevant in-
formation prior to receiving any reports of that information. Partial separability, taken as 
the necessary and sufficient criterion for determining ceteris paribus conditions, forbids 
us from fixing total individual strength and plausibility simultaneously in order to isolate 
C. However, it requires that we fix one or other of these factors individually. The problem 
is that it provides us with conflicting recommendations regarding which to fix. Consider-
ing strength first, we should hold this factor constant; from thereon, the principle of par-
tial separability will ban us from fixing joint plausibility. Considering joint plausibility first, 
we should fix this property; thereafter, we will not be allowed to hold strength constant lest 
we also fix C. So we receive conflicting advice depending on the order in which we consider 
various factors. 
Second, like complete separability, this criterion would lead to counterintuitive results. 
Specifically, this principle falls prey to the first sort of danger mentioned above; it appar-
ently requires one to fix too much. One can point to cases where, in order to isolate some 
property, we would clearly not want to fix some particular factor — else our study would 
be artificially constrained — despite the fact that doing so would not thereby fix our tar-
get property. Say we are interested in investigating the effects of depression on body weight. 
While diet surely has an influence on depression, one’s diet does not determine whether 
he or she will be depressed; it is partially separable from this target property. But then, ac-
cording to this criterion, we should fix diet when isolating the effects of depression on body 
weight. To do so, however, would seem tantamount to delimiting our study artificially; 
after all, diet is arguably an important factor through which depression might affect body 
weight. 
Both of these problems indicate that the principle of partial separability is too lenient. 
It is too easy for factors to satisfy this requirement and thus we end up holding fixed too 
many things. In order to keep our ceteris paribus analyses from becoming artificially con-
strained, we will often need to let certain factors vary, despite the fact that holding them 
steady would not fix our target property. 
5 A more defensible statement of this candidate principle would have to include a further caveat. When 
isolating some target property, we are typically interested in uncovering whether that property alone has 
an influence on a particular “end property’’; in the examples above, we want to know whether coher-
ence alone is conducive to confirmation or whether dietary habits alone have an influence on lung can-
cer rates. Taking partial separability as the criterion dividing factors that should from those that should 
not be fixed, we would be required to fix values of end properties in standard cases where these do not 
determine our target properties; lung cancer rates do not determine people’s dietary habits, and so par-
tial separability would have us fix lung cancer rates in order to isolate the effects of diet on lung cancer 
rates! A more defensible principle of partial separability would thus have us fix all properties other than 
end properties that are partially separable from our target property.
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The upshot is that, in order to isolate the influence of a target property, we clearly must 
require appropriately fixed properties to be partially separable from this property. How-
ever, this requirement taken by itself is too weak; a strictly stronger principle is needed. 
By contrast, we open our investigation to confounding influences if we go so far as to re-
quire that factors be completely separable; this requirement is too strong. So the correct 
principle(s) for choosing appropriate ceteris paribus conditions must lie somewhere be-
tween partial and complete separability. Ultimately, more work is required to uncover the 
elusive principle(s), but the goal is worthy. Amongst other things, an accurate evaluation of 
conditions (1)–(3) and further investigation into the alleged impossibility of Bayesian Co-
herentism wait on such an account. 
A. Changing Values of C While Enforcing (1)-(3)
The point of this appendix is to prove that it is possible to have changing degrees of co-
herence (as measured by C) even while enforcing conditions (1)–(3). Following Schu-
bert’s lead, we focus on scenarios in which n = 2. Accordingly, we wish to prove the fol-
lowing: 
Changing Coherence Ceteris Paribus. There exist cases in which all of the following conditions 
hold: 
(1) Pr(A1) × Pr(A2) = Pr' (A1) × Pr' (A2)
(2) Pr(E1 ∧ E2) = Pr' (E1 ∧ E2)
(3) Pr(E1 | A1) = Pr' (E1 | A1), Pr(E2 | A2) = Pr' (E2 | A2), Pr(E1 | ¬A1) = Pr' (E1 | ¬A1), 
and Pr(E2 | ¬A2) = Pr' (E2 | ¬A2),
and for which it is also true that: 
CPr {A1,A2}( )= Pr(A1∧A2 )Pr(A1)×Pr(A2 )
≠
P ′r (A1∧A2 )
P ′r (A1)×P ′r (A2 )
=CP ′r {A1,A2}( ) .
Because the denominators of CPr({A1, A2}) and CPr' ({A1, A2}) must be equal by (1), it suffices to 
show that there exist cases in which (1)–(3) are satisfied and Pr (¬A1 ∧ A2) ≠ Pr' (¬A1 ∧ A2).
Notation. In what follows, let x = Pr' (A1 ∧ ¬A2), y = Pr' (¬A1 ∧ A2), and z = Pr' (¬A1 ∧ ¬A2).
Proof 1. Begin with probability distribution Pr, which includes all of the following in-
formation: Pr(A1) = Pr(A2) = .5, Pr(A1 ∧ A2) = .25, Pr(E1 | A1) = Pr(E2 | A2) = .75
, and Pr(E1 | ¬A1) = Pr(E2 | ¬A2) = .25. As Schubert shows, from these probabilities, one 
can calculate CPr({A1, A2}) = 1 and Pr(E1 ∧ E2) = .25.
Now we consider the case where, instead of increasing Pr(A1 ∧ A2) = .25 to 
Pr' (A1 ∧ A2) = .375 (a move which Schubert shows is not allowed by the ceteris paribus 
conditions), we decrease the same term to Pr' (A1 ∧ A2) = .17. Schubert (2012, 8) shows 
that the following equality holds in any witness context (as defined by Bovens and Hart-
mann):
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(*)
 
P ′r (E1∧E2)= P ′r (A1∧A2)P ′r (E1 | A1)P ′r (E2 | A2)
+ x P ′r (E1 | A1)P ′r (E2 |¬A2)
+ y P ′r (E1 |¬A1)P ′r (E2 | A2)
+z P ′r (E1 |¬A1)P ′r (E2 |¬A2)
Given (3) and the stipulated fact that Pr' (A1 ∧ A2) = .17, we can calculate the first sum-
mand on the right hand side of this equation: 
P ′r (A1∧A2)P ′r (E1 |A1)P ′r (E2 |A2)= .17× .75× .75= .095625.
Subtracting this value from Pr' (E1 ∧ E2) = .25 (known by (2)) and filling in the values 
(given to us via (3)) of Pr' (E1 | A1), Pr' (E2 | A2), Pr' (E1 | ¬A1), and Pr' (E2 | ¬A2), we get 
the following:
(E1') .1875 x + .1875 y + .0625 z = .154375
Pr' (A1 ∧ A2), x, y, and z must sum to 1; therefore, we also get the following:
(E2') x + y + z = .83
Unlike the system of equations that Schubert examines ((E1) and (E2)), equations (E1') 
and (E2') do not suffice to determine the values of x, y, and z (proof omitted). The ques-
tion thus arises whether any solutions exist that satisfy the lone remaining condition (1) — 
we have already enforced our other conditions above, and so we have already ensured that 
these are satisfied. (1) may be stated in terms of Pr' (A1 ∧ A2) = .17, x, and y as follows: 
(E3') (x + .17) (y + .17) = .25
Solutions to equations (E1'), (E2'), and (E3') do exist (calculations omitted), including the 
following two: {x = .116061, y = .703939, z = .01}, {x = .703939, y = .116061, z = .01}. 
  
Proof 1 compares cases in which A1 and A2 are statistically independent and negatively rel-
evant respectively. In the following alternative proof, we instead look at an instance in which 
these propositions are positively relevant. 
Proof 2. Begin with probability distribution Pr, which includes all of the following in-
formation: Pr(A1) = .6, Pr(A2) = .5, Pr(A1 ∧ A2) = .4, Pr(E1 | A1) = .7, Pr(E2 | A2) = .6, 
and Pr(E1 | ¬A1) = 3/8, Pr(E2 | ¬A2) = 3/7. From these probabilities, one can calculate 
CPr({A1, A2}) = 4/3. 
Now consider the case where we increase Pr(A1 ∧ A2) = .4 to Pr' (A1 ∧ A2) = .5. Given 
(3), we can calculate the first summand on the right hand side of (*) as follows: 
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Pr' (A1 ∧ A2) Pr' (E1 | A1) Pr' (E2 | A2) = .5 × .7 × .6 = .21
Subtracting this value from Pr' (E1 ∧ E2) (known by (2)) and filling in the values (given to us 
via (3)) of Pr' (E1 | A1), Pr' (E2 | A2), Pr' (E1 | ¬A1), and Pr' (E2 | ¬A2), we get the following: 
(E1'') .3 x + .225 y + .1607 z = .088714
Pr' (A1 ∧ A2), x, y, and z must sum to 1; therefore, we also get the following: 
(E2'') x + y + z = .5
The question now arises whether any solutions exist that satisfy the lone remaining condition (1): 
(E3'') (x + .5) (y + .5) = .3
Solutions to equations (E1''), (E2''), and (E3'') do exist, including the following: 
{x = .029054, y = .0607050, z = .403896}. 
  
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